Archive for the ‘European politics’ Category

Why has the populist radical right outperformed the populist radical left in Europe?

Valerio Alfonso Bruno and James F. Downes draw on recent election data to show the extent to which the radical right has tended to outperform the radical left since the late-2000s financial crisis. They argue that the radical right has been able to offer a clearer message on key issues such as immigration which has translated into greater electoral success.

Twenty-first century European politics has been characterised by patterns of electoral volatility, alongside the recent economic and ongoing refugee crisis. This has allowed ‘populist’ parties on both the right and left to capitalise on the electoral failure of mainstream centre left and right parties.

There has been a considerable amount of research on the recent rise of populist radical right and populist radical left parties. A number of studies have shown that these parties have shaken up the political landscape in contemporary European politics during times of economic and political crisis. But surprisingly few studies have examined the electoral fortunes of radical right and left parties together.

Electoral gains

The figure below demonstrates that in the last two national parliamentary elections that fall across the recent refugee crisis period, the radical right made the largest electoral gains in EU countries. Mainstream centre left parties suffered the largest losses, underlining the electoral downfall of this party family in the post-economic crisis period and wider anti-incumbency effects. Radical left parties performed well electorally, but their electoral gains were considerably lower than those of radical right parties.

Figure: Percentage vote share change for different types of political parties (last two national parliamentary elections amongst the EU28)

Source: Authors’ own dataset (Downes, 2018)

The radical right has made considerable use of the refugee crisis to build its support. Two of the most striking examples are the 2017 Austrian legislative election which ultimately saw the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) entering into coalition with the centre right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), and the 2018 Italian legislative election, which saw the radical right League enter into a coalition with the Five Star Movement.

Those radical left parties which have made gains in recent national parliamentary elections include the Left Bloc (BE) in Portugal, which substantially increased its vote share in the 2015 Portuguese legislative election. Other parties, such as Syriza in Greece, and Podemos in Spain, have achieved notable electoral success over the last decade. It is important to note however that this success is not uniform, with some parties faring less well electorally and others facing challenges maintaining their support.

The radical right’s winning formula

What factors can explain the electoral success of radical right parties in the post-economic crisis period? First, the party strategy of the radical right has tended to be simple and clear, with a focus on issues such as immigration and an attempt to link this directly to general discontent and dissatisfaction with the EU. Second, the radical right has a much broader voter base to target with this narrative than radical left parties have. Recent research has shown that radical right parties have the ability to attract traditional working-class voters away from centre left parties, primarily due to their effective use of the immigration issue.

The simplicity and clarity of the radical right message has been a key part of their success. Powerful images of nationhood have combined with fears over issues such as immigration to drive this support. Capitalising on popular fears has been shown by previous research to be a core element of the radical right narrative. And the ‘accessibility’ of this message is arguably one of the most important differences between the approach of the radical right and the radical left.

In contrast, the radical left remains to some extent a platform for abstract intellectual ideas. Such narratives are far more difficult to translate into the slogans and messages which have proven successful in the digital age of politics. The perceived inability of the radical left to form concrete policy responses to the global economic crisis has not helped their cause. The radical left has in many cases failed to weave together a clear and simple narrative on the economy which can rival the message of the radical right, while it has also been less willing to focus on the key issue of immigration which the radical right has used so effectively to attract support.

Radical right parties have ultimately been better placed to offer a clear ‘populist’ message on issues such as immigration and the EU, thereby capitalising on the disaffection of voters. But understanding the reasons why the radical right, as opposed to the radical left, has proven particularly adept at winning support will be of obvious importance for European politics in the coming years as the electoral power of populism is unlikely to disappear in the short-term.

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Note: This article was originally published on LSE EUROPP and is is based on the authors’ working paper “The Electoral Success of the Radical Right in Europe (2013-2018): Why are the Radical Right better at “capitalizing” on ‘Populism’ than the Radical Left?”

About the Authors

Valerio Alfonso Bruno  holds a Ph.D. in “Institutions and Policies” from the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore of Milan (2017) and was doctoral researcher at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland (2015).

 

 

James F. Downes is a Lecturer in Comparative Politics in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is an Affiliated Visiting Research Fellow (Honorary) at the Europe Asia Policy Centre for Comparative Research. He is also a Data Advisor for the Local Democracy Dashboard project, based at the London School of Economics.

 

All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Featured image credit: Pixabay (Public Domain).

Austria’s EU presidency: Brexit will be on the sidelines

On 1 July, Austria took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union for the third time. As Paul Schmidt notes, since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009, the role of the presidency has fundamentally changed. He assesses how much room for manoeuvre this leaves to make a difference, and what we can expect from the upcoming Austrian presidency.

Credit: Michael Tholen (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

On 1 July, Austria will be the next country – after Bulgaria – to take over the presidency of the Council of the European Union. This time the EU presidency will be different for the government in Vienna. With the Lisbon Treaty, the role of the country holding the six-months rotating Council presidency has changed. The permanent President of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the increased importance of the Eurogroup and the amplified role of the European Parliament as well as the trio presidencies are all elements of continuity, but have also reduced the room for political manoeuvre for the country in charge.

Yet, there remain many ways to make a mark. It is still the rotating EU-Council presidency that sets the agenda, organises and chairs more than 300 official meetings including nine Council formations, and coordinates between the different positions of the other EU member states. In addition, the Austrian EU presidency will be the last full presidency before the elections of the European Parliament in May next year and is thus expected to successfully complete many of the approximately 190 legislative proposals on the table.

There are at least three central issues on the EU agenda: the new proposal by the European Commission regarding the next seven-year EU budget, the difficult but nevertheless rather crucial dossier on a common approach to asylum and migration, and the continuous red lines for Brexit talks with Westminster. While the complicated EU budget negotiations will likely peak in 2020, before the multiannual financial framework is due to enter into force, the Brexit negotiations need to be concluded by October and there is also a high sense of urgency to avoid failure regarding a common European approach to asylum and migration challenges.

It is therefore no coincidence that the Austrian government is dedicating the upcoming six months to its motto “A Europe that protects”. In particular, it is focusing on efforts regarding security in Europe and the fight against illegal migration, securing welfare and competition by advancing the digital single market, and striving for stability in the European neighbourhood, with special support for the countries of the Western Balkans on their path towards EU-accession.

Expect the Austrian presidency to play by its role as an honest broker and to mediate between different national interests. The government in Vienna will present itself as a bridge-builder and for the next six months will refrain from directly formulating its own policy preferences at any of the European meetings. Yet, the European agenda is only half of the story. Also important will be Austria’s attempts to push for progress in the debate over the future of Europe and – with European elections around the corner – to initiate public discussions in Europe and at home.

In this context, reviving the EU-concept of subsidiarity is close to the government´s heart and at the very centre of its EU discourse. Many in Vienna are therefore waiting for the EU taskforce on subsidiarity to deliver its first tangible results. At the same time, the country in the EU driving seat needs to be well prepared for the unexpected. Challenges such as a looming trade war with the United States, a new wave of migration in the south of Europe, or a ‘no deal’ Brexit have the potential to turn the agenda on its head.

The management of public expectations during these six months will be key to successfully completing the term. The truth is that possibilities to change the course of integration in this period of time are rather limited, but they do exist and should not be underestimated. The EU-Council presidency is still much more than a photo shoot. It is a time to render good service and to facilitate the success of European integration.

A longer discussion of this topic was published as a policy brief at Clingendael Magazine.  It first appeared on EUROPP – European Politics and Policy. It represents the views of the authors and not those of the Brexit blog, nor the LSE.

Paul Schmidt is Secretary General of the Austrian Society for European Politics.

EU Confronts Member States Issuing Citizenship for Money

DW - The European Commission is calling on EU countries to be more cautious when granting citizenships, according to an interview with Justice Commissioner Vera Jourova published in the German daily Die Welt on Tuesday.

Jourova said an increasing number of EU member states had been issuing citizenship to third-country nationals if they had previously invested large sums of money in their respective countries.

The Commission was "extremely concerned" about the escalation of "golden passports," being offered, the Czech politician said.

EU countries offering "golden visa" programs included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Between 2013 and 2017, Hungary also ran a golden visa program.

Transparency International accused them of running essentially "secret" schemes without EU oversight or disclosure of statistics, with the Schengen zone and the single European market as the key selling point. 

'Serious security risk'

"The granting of citizenship poses a serious security risk because it gives beneficiaries all the rights of EU citizens and allows them to move freely throughout the Union." Jourova told Die Welt.

"The EU must not become a safe haven for criminals, corruption and dirty money," she continued.

The newspaper singled out Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Bulgaria, Portugal, Lithuania, Latvia and Hungary as examples of EU states that had handed out a significant number of citizenships to wealthy Russians, Chinese, Africans and Turkish people in exchange for investment. 

Jourova insisted member states needed to "quickly adopt" new EU laws on combating money laundering.

"We don't want any trojan horses in the EU," she said. "Some member states must do more to ensure citizenship is not awarded to criminals."

Possession of an EU passport infers rights such as free movement inside the 28-nation bloc.

Which EU states sell citizenship?

About 87 percent of people who acquired citizenship in an EU state in 2016 were previously citizens of a non-EU country, with a total of 863,300 citizenships granted — a 19 percent increase compared to 2015.

Berlin-based anti-corruption lobby group Transparency International said it was possible to "buy" citizenship in these countries under the following criteria:

Austria: National legislation allows citizenship to be granted for "rendering exceptional services in the interest of the Republic," and while a minimum contribution is not specified by law, the price tag is reported to be as high as €10 million ($11.6 million).

Cyprus: Citizenship can be acquired after investing €2 million in real estate, companies or government bonds. Earlier this year, Cyprus introduced plans to cap the number of Golden Visas it handed out to 700.

Hungary: Under Hungary's now suspended program, investment of €300,000 in special Hungarian government bonds, to be repaid in full after five years with a fixed interest rate of 2 percent.

Latvia: In 2010, the program gave five-year residence permits to applicants who invested as little as €71,150 in real estate. In 2014, the minimum investment amount increased to €275,000 in response to masses of applications.

Lithuania: Applicants must run a company with a minimum of three full-time employees and an equity value of €28,000, and hold at least one third of its shares.

Malta: Contribution of €650,000 to Government Development Fund, an additional contribution of €25,000 per family member, a further €150,000 investment in approved instruments, a minimum property purchase of €350,000 or lease of a residential property in Malta for a period of 5 years, at an annual rent of at least €16,000.

Portugal: Capital contribution of up to €1 million or real estate investment equal to or above €500,000 or €350,000 if property is located in urban regeneration areas, or the creation of 10 jobs. 

Entire EU put at risk

Eka Rostomashvili, Transparency's Advocacy & Campaigns Coordinator said the "golden visa" schemes put the entire EU at risk, including member states that did not operate such schemes.

Golden visas were being issued to investors who lacked "genuine motivation for investment in a given country by both the applicants and occasionally by the public agencies operating these schemes," Rostomashvili told DW.

As a result, real estate prices were spiking, for example, in Portugal, she said, adding that "some schemes might need to be shut down; some might need to be significantly reformed."

Instead of the secrecy, the EU "needs to adopt a common framework," said the Transparency spokesperson. "There needs to be clear criteria for citizenship- and residency-by-investment programs. . 

A five-year moratorium on Brexit is needed to allow the UK and the EU to fully get to grips with the process

The UK is set to leave the EU in March next year, but many of the key issues remain unresolved and there is now perceived to be a very real prospect of the country leaving without a deal in place. For Helmut K Anheier, the answer is not a second referendum given another vote would do little to resolve the division that currently exists in the UK over Brexit. Rather, he proposes a moratorium on Brexit, lasting up to five years, which would allow both the UK and the EU to fully get to grips with the process.

“Ungovernability” is a term not usually synonymous with the well-oiled administrative machinery of the UK state. In governance capacity rankings, it is usually among the world’s top ten, alongside Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Australia. But with a mere eight months to go before Brexit, the colossal task of rolling back 45 years of European integration, building new partnerships still both contested and unclear, and the attendant political uncertainty are straining capacities at Whitehall. The recent turmoil of resignations over the Prime Minister’s soft-Brexit “Chequers” deal is just the latest symptom, and the growing battle about the government´s White Paper another.

Popularised by social scientists like Samuel Huntington and Jürgen Habermas to describe over-stretched welfare states, ungovernability happens when institutions invite problems that become impossible to process in an orderly and routinised way. This self-generated demand overload is precisely the plight arising from current Brexit negotiations.

Since the ill-fated 2016 referendum, things have not gone well. The UK and Europe now face a precarious, even dangerous, situation in unknown territory. The UK is in a deep political crisis, unable to steer the course, and a Brexit gone wrong will be disastrous for all. As any sensible bureaucrat can see, “keep calm and carry on” is not the mantra to follow right now. Instead, the EU and its member states must reach out to the United Kingdom with an offer: let´s put a moratorium on the current Brexit process. Let´s review where we are, what´s gone wrong, and how we can put things right. There is nothing sacred about 30 March 2019, and it can be changed.

The peculiar ways of British governance

Ever since Article 50 was invoked, the UK’s negotiating position has become ever more constricted and its machinery ever more overloaded. But don’t blame Brussels and the hardline stance of its chief negotiator Michel Barnier. Instead, look to the peculiar ways of British governance: a parliamentary authority that invites continued bickering between a pro-Brexit government and a pro-remain parliament; the uncodified British constitution, which fails to elucidate which parliamentary majorities are required for major political decision like the Withdrawal Bill; and a tradition of internal party dissent and cross-bench deals that hamper unity and challenge the skill of any prime minister. These are stoking domestic uncertainty at a time when stability is sorely needed.

In essence, the UK has a divided public, divided parties, a divided government, and a civil service unsure of what to do before and after March. A political stalemate looms, with all the added unpredictability and implied injustices, such as the disproportionate influence of Northern Ireland’s pro-Brexit DUP in Theresa May’s government, which shows little regard for the country’s “remain” vote. A population highly affected by Brexit is thus disenfranchised, while continued peace in Northern Ireland depends on how the Irish border problem is solved or at least managed. In another twist, the only incentive for many senior members of the government to support the Chequers agreement and the White Paper is the fear of a Labour Prime Minister, Jeremy Corbyn. Not being able to win is now preferable to losing.

Emmanuel Macron, Theresa May and Angela Merkel, Credit: Number 10 (Crown Copyright)

An impossible deadline for disentanglement

For the administration, implementing the multitude of technical changes to disentangle the UK from EU rules and regulations will be impossible by mid-March. The Withdrawal Bill cannot handle the detail needed to unscramble 45 years of EU membership. This will leave many issues unresolved for some time – probably years – to come, and only uncertainty will prevail.

For the UK civil service, the issue is far greater than time pressure alone. It is the contestation that comes with ungovernability. As the sociologist Claus Offe once remarked, popular expectations, not efficiency considerations, decide what is ungovernable and what is not. The hard-Brexiteers want clear declarations of separation to prevent back-peddling and ambiguity once the country has left, while the soft-Brexiteers favour vague statements to keep options open.

This is the crux of ungovernability: normative components are a cog in the machinery of Whitehall, spreading uncertainty about what is accepted by whom and by when. The UK Exit department is in overdrive, but political directives are murky and shifting.

But why should the Commission care? The UK asked to leave, now faces a political mess, and is in denial about its prospects. Of course, this is a simplistic view, but the EU’s negotiating position is nonetheless correct: no country can leave the Union and end up better off outside than in. No country can cherry-pick and cut bilateral deals while still a member. At the same time, the EU should have a keen interest in mitigating the damage for all.

Interest wanes in the EU

It doesn’t help that the EU has moved on. Trump´s trade wars, illiberalism and nationalism have captured the public’s attention, and the people of Europe have accepted that the UK can and will leave. Cornish fisherman, Sunderland auto workers or City bankers are not among their concerns.

Positions have hardened. UK citizens, fed by an anti-European press, feel increasingly mistreated, even punished, by the EU. The Commission and popular opinion in Europe are increasingly indifferent and puzzled by what they see as Britain’s desire to have its cake and eat it too.

How can we handle such emotional responses amid growing nationalism and a persistent and deepening problem of ungovernability? In Britain, no major political reform effort other than Brexit has been undertaken for several years. Domestic politics are flagging and austerity measures continue – yet was it not the promise of more domestic spending that convinced many to vote “leave”? The country is entirely occupied, even paralysed, by Brexit, and has become increasingly self-centred. The danger is not that the UK and the EU will become strangers; more likely, they will become more like neighbours who misunderstand each other the more the gap between them widens.

The answer is certainly not a second referendum. It is not clear what this would achieve, as the country would remain divided, and, given the current domestic situation, this could invite even more political brinkmanship.

A five-year moratorium

A moratorium is one way forward, assuming the current UK government holds. If Brexit happens, let´s get it right. The EU should offer the UK a moratorium of up to five years, during which it will remain a member with full rights and obligations. The advantages are many. For one, it will span two UK governments, two EU Commissions, and two European Parliaments. This will bolster the legitimacy of the 2016 referendum, the process and the outcome. It will give businesses at least a medium-term perspective and allow for wiser investment decisions. It will give the millions of UK citizens living in mainland Europe and the millions of Europeans living in the UK the stability they need. And it will give the administrators and legal experts in Whitehall and Brussels the room they need to separate from each other in an orderly and routinised way.

It would also create an opportunity for honesty. The honesty to tell the British people, for example, that the promised funds for the NHS will never come, to help them understand that old-fashioned sovereignty comes at a price and requires sacrifice – economically, politically, culturally. They need time to prepare for a world that is not waiting for a “Global Britain,” and to understand that illiberal regimes and autocracies are all too eager to take advantage of a relatively isolated country.

On the flipside, Europeans need to hear that Brussels has frequently over-stepped its bounds and alienated many; that its technocratic approach to deeply political problems can threaten people´s identities, and that its ways and means, especially the democratically unchecked role of the European Court of Justice, continues to undermine the legitimacy of national parliaments.

Of course, many will question such a proposal. Hard Brexiteers will see it as way to undo Brexit by stealth – yet no majority in government and parliament backs them anyway. Soft Brexiteers will view the moratorium with suspicion on the same grounds but should soon realise the advantages a well-prepared Brexit could hold. The Commission may baulk at dragging the process out even longer, given its many other pressures, but should welcome a more depoliticised process and more measured pace.

Yet all parties should come to terms with an outcome that seems ever more likely: Brexit will have few winners but many losers in the UK as well as in Europe. No good has come of it so far, and any longer-term benefits are uncertain. The world has become a more hostile place since the referendum in 2016, and neither the UK nor the EU alone can make it better, and certainly not in haste.

This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE Brexit or the London School of Economics. This article first appeared on our sister site EUROPP – European Politics and Policy.

Helmut K. Anheier is a Professor of Sociology and President of the Hertie School of Governance, and a Visiting Professor at LSE IDEAS.

Passenger Traffic up at European Airports as Freight Growth Fades

European airport trade body, ACI EUROPE, today released its air traffic report for June, Q2 & H1, revealing that during the first half of this year (H1), passenger traffic at Europe’s airports grew by an average +6.7%, whilst freight traffic only rose by +3.3% during H1.

Passenger traffic in the less mature non-EU market increased by +10.5% - nearly twice the expansion rate of the EU market: +5.4%. Both markets saw the growth dynamic recede slightly in Q2 over Q1 – from +12.5% to +9.4% at non-EU airports and from +6.2% to +4.9% at EU airports.

In the EU, airports in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia achieved double digit growth. Meanwhile, airports in Sweden posted to the lowest growth within Europe (+1.5%), due to the combination of the new national aviation tax introduced last April, the bankruptcy of regional airline Nextjet and lower outbound demand in the wake of local currency hitting its lowest value in years. Sweden became the only European market losing passenger traffic in June (-0.4%), with its new aviation tax among the factors leading to the improved performance of airports in neighbouring Denmark (+5.7%).

In the non-EU market, passenger traffic grew in excess of +15% at airports in Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia and Israel and Iceland. 

The Majors (Europe’s top five busiest airports) recorded a passenger traffic increase of +6.3% in H1 – a notable improvement over their 2017 performance (+4.3%). Istanbul-Atatürk topped the league in terms of growth (+12.9%), followed by Frankfurt (+9.1%). Amsterdam-Schiphol also reported robust growth (+5.4%), followed by Paris-CDG (+3.0% - whose performance was impacted by repeated strikes at Air France) and capacity constrained London-Heathrow (+2.6%).

Stronger growth focused mainly on secondary & smaller hubs as well as selected medium sized & larger regional airports – reflecting ever evolving competitive dynamics largely driven by Low Cost Carriers and non-EU Full Service Carriers. These airports include: Istanbul-SAW (+12.4%), Lisbon (+12.9%), Milan-Malpensa (+11.1%), Athens (+11.4%), Tel Aviv (+13.1%), Helsinki (+12%), Moscow-Vnukovo (+19.8%), Warsaw (+14.8%), Prague (+10.3%), Budapest (+14.8%), Naples (+24.7%), Keflavik (+15.6%), Valencia (+20.2%), Krakow (+17.8%), Malta (+16.3%), Sevilla (+26.9%), Palermo (+16.9%), Nantes (+14%) and Heraklion (+14.2%). 

Freight traffic increased by just +3.3% during H1 – due to a deceleration in Q2 (+2.1%) compared to Q1 (+4.5%). Freight traffic growth in the EU was +2.4% - down from +3% in Q1.

Aircraft movements were up +3.6%, with airlines still deploying significant capacity into the market and little variations between Q1 and Q2.

Olivier Jankovec, Director General of ACI EUROPE commented: “Our expectations for the first half of the year were cautiously positive, not least because of the extraordinary rise in passenger traffic Europe has enjoyed last year. But the results we are issuing today reveal just how robust air traffic growth has remained so far. Such growth is clearly putting our aviation system under pressure – with the impact of both a lack of airport capacity and Air Traffic Management inefficiencies becoming more and more acute and now directly affecting air travellers.”

He added: “Looking ahead beyond the summer, the diminishing growth in freight traffic points to the economic risks from trade disputes and their escalation. Higher prices, disrupted supply chains and wavering exports are likely implications – which would inevitably end up affecting demand for air transport. The increasing odds of a “no-deal” Brexit scenario are just adding to the stress – and could soon start weakening consumer confidence.”  

During H1, airports welcoming more than 25 million passengers per year (Group 1), airports welcoming between 10 and 25 million passengers (Group 2), airports welcoming between 5 and 10 million passengers (Group 3) and airports welcoming less than 5 million passengers per year (Group 4) reported an average adjustment +6.1%, +6.6%, +7.9% and +7.5%.

The airports that reported the highest increases in passenger traffic are as follows:

GROUP 1:     Antalya (+25.2%), Moscow SVO (+13%), Lisbon & Istanbul IST (+12.9%), Istanbul SAW (+12.4%) and Frankfurt (+9.1%)

GROUP 2:     Ankara (+29.6%), Moscow VKO (+19.8%), Kiev (18.3%), Warsaw WAW & Budapest (+14.8%) and Tel Aviv (+13.1%)

GROUP 3:     Sevilla (+26.9%), Naples (+24.7%), Valencia (+20.2%), Riga (+18.2%) and Krakow (+17.8%)

GROUP 4:     Foggia (+48.5%), Batumi (+45.5%), Poznan (+39.7%), Varna (+37.1%) and Lublin (33.2%)

During the month of June, average passenger growth was +6.8%. Freight reported an increase of +1.6% and movements were up +3.3%. Airports welcoming more than 25 million passengers per year (Group 1), airports welcoming between 10 and 25 million passengers (Group 2), airports welcoming between 5 and 10 million passengers (Group 3) and airports welcoming less than 5 million passengers per year (Group 4) reported an average adjustment +6.8%, +6.2%, +5.9% and +8.8%.

For June, the airports which reported the highest increases in passenger traffic are as follows:

GROUP 1:     Antalya (+28.1%), Moscow SVO (+15.3%), London STN (+11.3%), Frankfurt (+9.8%) and Lisbon (+9.6%)

GROUP 2:     Moscow VKO (+18.2%), Kiev (+17.8%), Ankara (+17.0%), Warsaw WAW (+14.5%) and Budapest (+13.0%)

GROUP 3:     Sevilla (+24.7%), Keflavik (+17.1%), Riga (+15.6%), Malta (+14.7%) and Palermo (+14.3%)

GROUP 4:     Targu Mures (+845.9%), Maribor (+354.8%), Taranto (+181.2%), Kutaisi (+56.6%) and Bucharest (+49.3%)

 
The 'ACI EUROPE Airport Traffic Report – June, Q2 & H1 2018’ includes 239 airports in total representing more than 88% of European air passenger traffic.

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